Myth and the small war tradition: Reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency

In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars.     

Sir Robert Thompson,Strategic Patience and Nixon’s War in Vietnam

Counter-insurgency scholars have long been familiar with Sir Robert Thompson’s classic work Defeating Communist Insurgency, which combined analysis of the insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam with advice for counter-insurgents that emphasised the drawn-out nature of insurgency and the importance of focusing on population security. While historians have called attention to his role with the British Advisory Mission in South Vietnam and his later criticism of the US counter-insurgency campaign in Vietnam in his various books, less has been written about his subsequent role as a pacification advisor to the Nixon administration. This article explores Thompson’s relationship with Kissinger and Nixon and his views on the war in Vietnam from 1969 to 1974. An examination of Thompson’s thinking on Vietnam in the Nixon years reveals a theorist whose optimism on US prospects there was based on assumptions about elite and public patience for lengthy wars that were ultimately misplaced.     

基于在线学习的频谱感知次序策略*

认知无线电允许次级用户在频谱没有被主用户使用时动态地接入频谱进行数据传输。动态频谱接入是解决无线电频谱资源短缺和使用效率低下问题的有效方案,而频谱感知是实现动态频谱接入的关键挑战之一。次级用户的感知能力有限,为了快速找到频谱空闲概率最大的频段从而获得更多的频谱接入机会,研究了频谱感知次序问题。考虑到频谱空闲概率会随时间变化且对次级用户不可知,提出了一个在线学习框架,把频谱感知次序问题规约成经典多摇臂赌博机问题,并利用在线学习方法——满意折现汤普森抽样算法(satisficing discounted Thompson sampling)处理优化问题。仿真结果表明,和其他算法相比,所提算法可获得更多的频谱接入机会并且能够跟踪频谱空闲概率的变化。     

频谱感知次序的在线最优选择

动态频谱接入是解决无线电频谱资源短缺和频谱使用效率低下问题的有效方法,它允许次级用户在授权频谱空闲时动态地接入,以进行数据传输。而频谱感知是实现动态频谱接入的关键挑战之一。由于次级用户的感知能力有限,为了获得更多的频谱接入机会,需要尽快找到频谱空闲概率最大的频段,并研究频谱感知次序问题。考虑到频谱空闲概率对次级用户是不可知的,并且会随时间变化,提出了在线学习框架,把频谱感知次序问题归纳成经典多摇臂赌博机问题,并利用在线学习方法——满意折现汤普森抽样算法处理优化问题。仿真结果表明,和其他算法相比,所提算法可以获得更多的频谱接入机会并且能够跟踪频谱空闲概率的变化。     

在线学习的主用户仿冒攻击策略

在认知无线网络中,次用户通过频谱感知来学习频谱环境,从而接入那些没有被主用户占用的频谱空隙。事实上,多种恶意攻击的存在会影响次用户频谱感知的可靠性。只有深入研究恶意攻击策略,才能确保认知无线网络的安全。基于此,研究了一种认知无线网络中的欺骗性干扰策略,即主用户仿冒攻击策略,该攻击策略通过在信道上传输伪造的主用户信号来降低次用户频谱感知的性能。具体来说,将攻击策略问题建模为在线学习问题,并提出基于汤普森采样的攻击策略以实现在探索不确定信道和利用高性能信道间的权衡。仿真结果表明,与现有的攻击策略相比,提出的攻击策略能更好地通过在线学习优化攻击决策以适应非平稳的认知无线网络。